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Research into the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) has blossomed, due to the
advent of new and increasingly sophisticated brain research tools. Neuroimaging has
uncovered a variety of brain processes that relate to conscious perception, obtained in
a range of experimental paradigms. But methods such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging or electroencephalography do not always afford inference on the functional role
these brain processes play in conscious vision. Such empirical NCCs could reﬂect neural
prerequisites, neural consequences, or neural substrates of a conscious experience. Here,
we take a closer look at the use of non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) techniques in this
context. We discuss and review how NIBS methodology can enlighten our understanding
of brain mechanisms underlying conscious vision by disentangling the empirical NCCs.
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INTRODUCTION
The search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) con-
tinues. While “consciousness” has been a philosophical and
scientiﬁc topic of interest throughout the ages, the surging
development of brain research technology has caused something
of a renaissance in the last quarter century. Quick advance-
ments in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
electro-/magnetoencephalography (EEG/MEG), combined with
seminal contributions from high-proﬁle pioneers (e.g., Crick and
Koch, 1990), provided the NCC research program in humans
with quite some momentum (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Rees et al., 2002a; Crick and Koch, 2003; Koch, 2004), while
groundbreaking animal experiments were performed as well
(Cowey and Stoerig, 1995; Leopold and Logothetis, 1996). Today,
the neuronal mechanisms underlying “visual awareness,” “con-




No article on “consciousness” is likely to be very meaningful
without a clear delineation of what mental faculties exactly are
referred to. We previously outlined our preferred rough taxon-
omy of types of consciousness (de Graaf et al., 2012b). It included
(1) self-awareness, (2) higher-order consciousness, (3) “medical
awareness” or state-consciousness, and (4) “consciousness-as-
experience” or content-consciousness.
Self-awareness is the overarching concept of a continuous
and controlling self, a being that is deﬁned by the contrast
to surroundings and other beings. Research clustered under
self-awareness could include such topics as self-recognition,
agency, and awareness and situation of the persona inside the
body.
Higher-order consciousness in our schema is the somewhat
folk psychological conception of consciousness, where the abil-
ities to think, reason, and reﬂect are crucial. It involves typically
human faculties such as the realization of past and future, the
ability to “think about thinking,” and is likely analogous to, for
example, reﬂective consciousness (e.g., Edelman and Tononi,
2001).
Medical awareness, which for simpliﬁcation we may also refer
to as the more common “state consciousness,” is a conception of
consciousness as a certain state of being. Patients in a coma or
under anesthesia may not be in a conscious state, people under the
inﬂuence of drugs may be in an alternative conscious state. It is
required to be in at least some minimal state of consciousness to
achieve:
Consciousness as experience, which for simpliﬁcation we may
refer to as the more common “content consciousness.” At any
moment in time, provided we are awake (or at least dream-
ing), we have experiences. They include phenomenal properties
(the “what-it-is-like” of the experience) and psychological or
“access” properties (the abilities to report, remember, or act on
the experienced information; Chalmers, 1996; Block, 2005).
NCC PARADIGMS
Early on, pioneering consciousness researcher Baars (1989)
pointed out that NCCs can be obtained by contrasting condi-
tions with conscious experience to conditions without conscious
experience (the contrastive method, e.g., Aru et al., 2012). Using
neuroimaging paradigms, such as fMRI or EEG, one can contrast
these two experimental conditions to isolate the brainmechanisms
speciﬁc to the conscious condition. Ideally the conscious condition
and the non-conscious condition differ from each other as little
as possible in terms of stimulation parameters. Over the years,
a range of paradigms has been developed for NCC research that
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigms. NCC (neural correlates of
consciousness) paradigms. Illusions: If an illusion is deﬁned as a conscious
percept that is created endogenously, as opposed to exogenously, then it
may serve as a useful NCC stimulus. In most cases, small parameter
changes will extinguish the illusion. With for example the Kanizsa triangle,
the conscious percept of a triangular outline disappears if the corner
elements are rotated. The presence or absence of the conscious percept can
be correlated to brain activity. Another form of illusion is ﬁlling-in, in which a
constant peripheral stimulus is sometimes perceived and other times not.
Multistable paradigms: Constant visual stimulation leads to a changing
conscious percept. A well-known example is binocular rivalry, in which both
eyes receive incompatible images and conscious perception ﬂuctuates
between the two stimuli. Some brain processes will covary with perception,
others will not. ON–OFF paradigms: Paradigms in which sometimes a
stimulus is perceived, and other times not. It thus involves presence vs
absence of a conscious percept, as opposed to presence of percept A vs
presence of percept B as in multistable paradigms. The strong version
involves no changes in stimulation, the weak version does involve parameter
changes. For more details see main text. NCU (neural correlates of
“unconsciousness”) paradigms. ON–OFF paradigms: An ON–OFF paradigm
can be used for NCC studies if brain activity is contrasted in the ON vs the
OFF condition. The same stimuli and setup can be useful for NCU studies, if
brain activity is contrasted in the OFF condition vs rest. In other words;
which brain processes still obtain if a stimulus is presented but not
consciously perceived? Continuous ﬂash suppression: A variant of the
binocular rivalry paradigm, in which conscious perception is heavily biased
towards one eye through repeated salient stimulation of that eye, while the
second eye receives a weaker stimulus. That weaker stimulus of interest is
thus suppressed for prolonged periods of time, allowing analysis of brain
processes nevertheless responding to it.
allows useful contrasts with no, or minimal, changes in stimulus
parameters. Outlined in Figure 1, we have developed informally
our taxonomy of NCC research paradigms (also presented in de
Graaf and Sack, in press). We make no claim to either exhaus-
tiveness or originality/priority in this regard (see e.g., Kim and
Blake, 2005), it is simply a grouping that we have found use-
ful to maintain an overview of the many paradigms in NCC
research.
One main division is between paradigms to obtain NCCs
and paradigms that research neural correlates of unconsciousness
(NCUs). The latter are not always referred to as such, but investi-
gations of brain activity elicited by inputs that do not make it to
consciousness are clearly valuable in the greater scheme of NCC
research. For example, patients with (often right) parietal dam-
age may fail to consciously see (report) stimuli in the opposite
visual ﬁeld (“neglect”), especially when bilateral stimuli are pre-
sented (“extinction”). Yet brain imaging studies uncovered activity
in early and extrastriate visual regions, in response to these unseen
stimuli (Rees et al., 2000, 2002b; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Goebel
et al. (2001) studied fMRI activation in extrastriate regions in
blindsight patients. Blindsight is another neuropsychological con-
ditionwith relevance to consciousness, since in this conditionwith
damaged (connections to) primary visual cortex, patients can cor-
rectly report on (“guess”) various features of stimuli that are not
consciously perceived (Weiskrantz, 2009). One patient studied by
Goebel et al. (2001) experienced conscious motion perception in
only one visual hemiﬁeld, even though bilateral hMT/V5 cortices
were intact. Interestingly, activity in hMT/V5 in both hemispheres
was nearly identical with respect to BOLD responses to contralat-
eral visual stimulation. In other words, sustained hMT/V5 BOLD
activity did not seem to reﬂect the presence or absence of visual
awareness.
Neural correlates of unconscious processing can also be studied
in fully intact brains. In one clever fMRI experiment house and
face stimuli were presented either consciously (congruent dichop-
tic stimulation: e.g., a green house on red background presented
to both eyes) or not consciously (incongruent dichoptic stimula-
tion: e.g., a green house on red background in one eye and a red
house on green background in the other eye “canceled each other
out” at the binocular level). “Face areas” and “place areas” of the
brain still responded (although to a lesser extent) to completely
invisible pictures (Moutoussis and Zeki, 2002). As a second exam-
ple, an inﬂuential study (Dehaene et al., 2001) could show that
even words are processed in extrastriate regions when they are not
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consciously perceived due to visual masking. In some extrastriate
regions, the effects were moreover case-independent. Collec-
tively, these experiments seem to demonstrate that activation in
specialized higher-order visual regions is not in itself sufﬁcient for
conscious perception. Today, an increasingly popular paradigm
that can be used to study NCUs is continuous ﬂash suppres-
sion (CFS; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). This useful variation to
the classical binocular paradigm, in which a stimulus in one eye is
suppressed by salient ﬂashing patterns of stimulation in the other
eye, can be implemented to suppress visual stimuli for very long
durations.
A second main distinction that may be useful is between
“strong” and “weak” paradigms. “Strong” paradigms in this con-
text allow changes in conscious percept, or variations in conscious
percept, without any changes in stimulation parameters. “Weak”
paradigms, in contrast, implement small changes in stimulus
parameters to determine conscious content. This difference is eas-
ily understood in the context of “ON–OFF paradigms,” where
stimuli are consciously perceived (ON) or not (OFF). For exam-
ple in visual masking, experimenters can determine, through the
timing between targets and masks, whether targets will be per-
ceived or not (Breitmeyer and Ogmen, 2006). Since this involves a
change in stimulus parameters, it is a “weak” ON–OFF paradigm.
Alternatively, in a “strong” ON–OFF implementation the stim-
ulus parameters could be ﬁxed at some threshold level, relying
on spontaneous neuropsychological ﬂuctuations to lead to a
conscious percept on some trials (ON) but not on other trials
(OFF).
“Strong” and “weak” refer only to the level of isolation of
brain processes in relation to visual awareness, not the scientiﬁc
value of the paradigm. While constant stimulus parameters allow
a “cleaner” isolation of the brain processes related to conscious
perception, weak paradigms afford the experimenter control and
certainty about the presence, absence, or contents of visual aware-
ness. Both thus have their advantages and disadvantages, and
appropriate applications depend on experimental question and
brain imaging setup.
All of the various paradigms in Figure 1 could yield a number
of brain processes correlated to conscious vision, including BOLD
activations, fMRI connectivity patterns, EEG/MEG event-related
potentials, changes in oscillatory power or phase coherence, and
so on. All such brain mechanisms would, by deﬁnition, correlate
to conscious contents. And they would therefore, in the literal
sense, be NCCs: neural processes that correlate to conscious-
ness. But in the conceptual and philosophical domain, “NCC”
can have quite a speciﬁc and involved meaning. So from now
on, we refer to such experimental ﬁndings strictly as empirical
NCCs.
CORRELATES AND “TRUE CORRELATES”
After all, another, or perhaps “true,” meaning of NCC’s has
traditionally been the actual brain mechanisms responsible for
conscious perception. Deﬁnitions abound, but an inﬂuential deﬁ-
nition of a neural correlate of consciousness comes from Chalmers
(Chalmers, 2000):
AnNCC is aminimal neural systemNsuch that there is amapping
from states of N to states of consciousness, where a given state of
N is sufﬁcient, under conditions C, for the corresponding state of
consciousness. (Chalmers, 2000, p. 31)
Clearly,“NCC”here ismuchmore reﬁned and constrained than
the“empiricalNCCs”obtained in neuroimaging research using the
contrastive method.
This realization has quite a long history, as pointed out by
Miller (2007, p. 162). For instance, Crick (1994) noted: “it does
not follow that these particular neurons are the real seat of aware-
ness. They may by their ﬁring, inﬂuence other neurons... that are
the true correlates of awareness” (Crick, 1994, p. 218). Logothetis
(1998, p. 541) asked: “Do neurons responding only when a stim-
ulus is perceived actually mediate the conscious experience of this
stimulus?”He pointed out that, although his data favored such an
interpretation, they “cannot prove it unequivocally” (Logothetis,
1998). There have been others (e.g., Revonsuo, 2000) who noted
what Miller (2001, 2007) calls the “constitution/correlation prob-
lem;” brain processes that correlate to conscious perception may
not necessarily be constituent of that conscious experience. Koch,
lastly, points out that it makes sense to distinguish “core NCCs”
from “total NCCs,” where core NCCs are responsible for the con-
tents of conscious experience, whereas the total NCC reﬂects the
coreNCCplus all enabling factors and is thus required as awhole to
obtain a particular conscious experience (Koch, 2004, as discussed
in Block, 2005).
THREE ROLES FOR EMPIRICAL NCCs
In fact, increasing numbers of philosophical (Revonsuo, 2001;
Noë and Thompson, 2004; Block, 2005; Miller, 2007; Hohwy,
2009; Neisser, 2012) and empirical researchers (Miller, 2001,
2007; Koch, 2004; Bachmann, 2009; Melloni et al., 2011; Aru
et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012b; Kanai and Tsuchiya, 2012;
Sergent and Naccache, 2012) have been coming to the conclusion
that empirical NCCs are only part of the way there. To make this
explicit, as a prelude to outlines for future research opportunities,
two similar review papers (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012b)
recently focused on the three fundamentally distinct functional
roles that any (part of an) empirical NCC resulting from the con-
trastive method could reﬂect. They are neural prerequisites, neural
consequences, or neural substrates of conscious experience.
NEURAL SUBSTRATES
Neural substrates of a particular conscious experience are the
brain events that directly caused (epiphenomenalism), reﬂected
(dualism), or were identical with (materialism) the phenomenal
experience in our experiment. They were both necessary and suf-
ﬁcient. “Sufﬁcient” in the sense of Chalmer’s deﬁnition: only these
brain events were required for the experience and nothing more
was needed. They were “necessary” only in our current empirical
situation (imagine any concrete NCC neuroimaging experiment),
and in a non-philosophical sense (“necessary” is rather a loaded
term in the context of consciousness), because without these brain
events the experience would not have occurred. Hypothetically,
perhaps other brain events could have served as substrates for the
same, or a similar experience. But in our experiment, it was these
brain processes that instantiated the experience. In the current
context, there is no clear difference between what we have called
“neural substrates,” and the “NCC” of Chalmers, the “real” NCC,
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“true” NCC, or the “NCC-proper.” We refer to it as “neural sub-
strate of conscious experience” to differentiate it from all the other
different types of NCCs discussed here, and to remain consistent
with our earlier outlines (de Graaf et al., 2012b; de Graaf and Sack,
in press).
NEURAL PREREQUISITES
Neural prerequisites of consciousness are brain events that are
necessary for the conscious experience to occur, but not sufﬁ-
cient. They are empirical NCCs, since they consistently co-vary
with conscious experience. That is because, in the implemented
experimental setup, in the real world, the neural substrates do
not arise without them. But importantly, if somehow through
some hypothetical and counterfactual scenario the neural sub-
stratesdid arisewithout theprerequisites, the conscious experience
would be there and unchanged. To understand this, one might
imagine highly advanced brain stimulation techniques targeting
speciﬁcally and only the neural substrates. Or, somewhat more
realistically, a different experimental paradigm could give rise
to the same neural substrates of a conscious experience, via a
different route and thus through different neural prerequisites.
Or perhaps it would be possible to attain an identical conscious
experience in a dream, without any external stimuli, leaving out
some neural prerequisites that obtained in our experiment. In
sum, different chains of brain events might have served as pre-
requisites to the same neural substrates. But, coming back to
our perspective as an empirical researcher, we are talking about
empirical NCCs that factually did result from a concrete brain
imaging experiment with a given experimental paradigm. And we
are outlining possible functional roles of these empirical NCCs.
So, in the empirical situation at hand, some of our empirical
NCCs could, and likely would, have functioned as neural pre-
requisites of the studied conscious experience, rather than being
the neural substrates. It is useful to distinguish these functional
roles.
Expanding on our previous outline (de Graaf et al., 2012b) and
as discussed in detail in de Graaf and Sack (in press), it may be
useful to further distinguish two possible “types”of neural prereq-
uisites: content-invariant prerequisites, and content-speciﬁc pre-
requisites. Content-invariant prerequisites would co-occur with
any conscious experience. Much of the ﬁndings on brain events
enabling a conscious state would pertain to content-invariant pre-
requisites. For example, connectivity between reticular formation
and precuneus might be required for any conscious experience to
arise (Silva et al., 2010). Content-invariant prerequisites are inter-
esting, but would be relatively easy to identify by eliciting different
contents of consciousness across different NCC paradigms and
seeing which empirical NCCs are consistently observed.
Content-speciﬁc prerequisites would be much more tricky to
dissociate from neural substrates, since they co-occur, by deﬁni-
tion, with and only with each occurrence of a particular conscious
experience. For example, a particular visual image presented for
a sufﬁciently long duration will consistently lead to a speciﬁc
conscious experience of it, but also to a (in part) speciﬁc cas-
cade of non-conscious feature processing steps in early visual
regions. To complicate things further, in reality the distinction
between content-speciﬁc and content-invariant prerequisites may
not be a dichotomy, but something of a continuum. There may
be modality-speciﬁc prerequisites, feature-speciﬁc prerequisites,
perhaps even concept-speciﬁc prerequisites, and so on.
As a concrete example, some binocular rivalry results have
implicated primary visual cortex in conscious vision (Polonsky
et al., 2000; Tong and Engel, 2001), and we learn from blindsight
patients that this region appears to be crucial for conscious vision
(Weiskrantz, 2009). Yet, Crick and Koch (1995) argued that pri-
mary visual cortex is unlikely to be part of neural substrates (“true
correlates”) of consciousness. Primary visual cortex activationmay
therefore be a neural prerequisite, and perhaps particular pro-
cesses within it content-speciﬁc prerequisites. As Silvanto (2008)
argues, these processes may be crucial for conscious vision to arise,
even though the conscious experience is localized elsewhere in the
brain.
In another example, Beck et al. (2006) reported on the role of
parietal cortex in change blindness. Finding that parietal rhythmic
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) slowed reaction times
to change and reduced the proportion of detected changes, they
concluded “It is important to note that we are not arguing that the
parietal cortex is the neural locus of consciousness, but rather that
the functions associated with parietal cortex, such as attention and
visual short term memory (VSTM), may be necessary prerequisites
to visual awareness” (Beck et al., 2006, p. 716). They suggested that
the functional relevance of parietal cortex should be tested in other
paradigms to determine whether this role is general rather than
speciﬁc to change blindness (in our terminology; whether it is a
content-invariant prerequisite). As a clear prelude to discussing
the value of non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) in the current
framework, we may focus on another quote from the Introduction
of the same article. After discussing prior neuroimaging work: “In
all these studies, it remains possible that the parietal activity found
was a consequence of subjects’ awareness and did not play either a
necessary or causal role in producing that awareness” (Beck et al.,
2006, p. 712).
NEURAL CONSEQUENCES
There may be brain events that consistently co-occur with a con-
scious experience, that are neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for the
experience to arise. They are not substrates, and they are not even
required for the substrates to arise, so they would – with regards
to the phenomenal experience – not be missed. Yet, they are there,
because they consistently follow a conscious experience.
Again, consequences can be content-invariant or content-
speciﬁc. Content-invariant consequences would be empirical
NCCs across the range of contents of consciousness. They could
include attention effects, if the simple occurrence of an experi-
ence grabs your attention, or response preparation and memory
processes (we’re evolved to act on and learn from consciously
perceived information). Consequences can therefore be – while
useless to the neural substrates of a conscious experience – rather
useful for the organism. Citing Seth (2009), Aru et al. (2012) point
out that, indeed, meaningful neural consequences of conscious
experience are a logical consequence of assigning any functionality
to conscious perception. As with prerequisites, while content-
invariant consequences could be isolated through variations in
NCC paradigms and stimuli, content-speciﬁc consequences are
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more difﬁcult to distinguish from neural substrates. If a picture
of a beach elicits in me strong emotional memories of a long-lost
friend, stimuli depicting beaches could consistently elicit in me a
cascade of brain events that would not only be content-speciﬁc,
but even participant-speciﬁc.
DISENTANGLING EMPIRICAL NCCs
There are thus three fundamentally different roles onemight assign
to (part of) any empirical NCC. And things may become even
more complex, if it turns out that combinations of and interac-
tions between content-speciﬁc and content-invariant brain events
are responsible for conscious experiences. That would make sep-
arations of neural prerequisites and substrates difﬁcult, or even
somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, as new evidence continues to
inform neurobiological models of consciousness, we should fol-
low the advice of properly thinking through the cascade of brain
events that underlies conscious experience, reframing the question
as we go (Hohwy, 2009; Feinberg, 2012; Neisser, 2012). This way,
theoretical and computational models will become increasingly
sophisticated (Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011;
Oizumi et al., 2014). For the moment, however, research with the
contrastive method (Aru et al., 2012), using paradigms such as
those outlined in Figure 1, continues to specify and increasingly
constrain empirical NCCs. There are different strategies to try
and disentangle the functional roles of empirical NCCs (Aru et al.,
2012; de Graaf et al., 2012b). In the remainder of this article, we
focus on the contributions of NIBS in this context.
EMPIRICAL NCCs
Before continuing on to our review of NIBS as a tool for NCC
research, it is useful to provide a very quick and rough overview of
some empirical NCCs that have been obtained in neuroimaging
research. These form, after all, the “starting point” for brain stim-
ulation experiments to probe functional roles of speciﬁc empirical
NCCs.
While oversimpliﬁed, it seems fair to claim that early visual
cortex (by which we mean V1, V2, V3), certain extrastriate
visual/temporal cortices, parietal cortex, and frontal cortex have
been linked to conscious vision. We have above already men-
tioned important studies demonstrating relations between visual
awareness and early visual regions. The relevance of increasingly
modular extrastriate cortices in vision in general is uncontro-
versial, and for example bistable vision paradigms have shown
that extrastriate regions such as the fusiform face area (FFA) or
the parahippocampal place area (PPA) reﬂect conscious percept
rather than the constant visual input (Tong et al., 1998). Bistable
paradigms (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998; Lumer et al., 1998; Lumer
and Rees, 1999; Sterzer et al., 2002), but also masking (Dehaene
et al., 2001), and other NCC paradigms (Rees et al., 2002a; Rees,
2007) have generally reported frontoparietal activations in fMRI.
Frontoparietal activations are stronger to trials inwhich stimuli are
consciously seen versus not seen (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2001; Lau
and Passingham, 2006), are time-locked to speciﬁcally endoge-
nous perceptual switching (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998; Lumer et al.,
1998), and are related to attentional/perceptual effects often men-
tioned in the context of consciousness such as change blindness
(Beck et al., 2001) and attentional blink (Marois et al., 2000). The
following section will describe how NIBS has contributed to our
understanding of the functional roles of these empirical NCCs.
NON-INVASIVE BRAIN STIMULATION
BASICS OF NIBS
Non-invasive brain stimulation includes primarily TMS and tran-
scranial electric stimulation (TES), the latter including transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and transcranial alternating
current stimulation (tACS).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation involves a strong capacitor
linked to a coil. A single TMS pulse with the popular ﬁgure-eight
coil requires a brief electrical current through the overlapping
windings inside the coil, which leads to a short, focal, rapidly
changing magnetic ﬁeld extending perpendicularly from the TMS
coil. If the coil is placed tangentially on a human head, this
magnetic pulse extends into the brain where it induces an elec-
trical ﬁeld in neural tissue and ultimately causes action potentials
(Wassermann et al., 2008). A single pulse can stimulate neurons
at rest, with observable behavioral (motor response; e.g., Barker
et al., 1985) or perceptual (phosphenes; e.g., Marg and Rudiak,
1994; Kammer, 1999) consequences. A single pulse administered
to a region during processing can disrupt the spatiotemporal
organization of regional processing and thus induce behavioral
(Pascual-Leone et al., 1991), cognitive (Sack et al., 2002a,b), or per-
ceptual (Amassian et al., 1989) impairments (Pascual-Leone et al.,
2000). Multiple TMS pulses in a rhythmic sequence, rTMS, can
not only impair function online, but also have effects on cor-
tical excitability outlasting the stimulation protocol (Robertson
et al., 2003). More complex and powerful new protocols have been
developed [theta-burst stimulation (TBS); Huang et al., 2005], but
traditionally simple repetitive stimulation of a cortical region with
low frequency (∼1 Hz) has been shown to result in decreased cor-
tical excitability while stimulation at high frequency (∼5 to 20 Hz)
has been shown to result in increased cortical excitability (Dayan
et al., 2013).
TES can have similar effects on cortical excitability. It involves
a power source connected to (minimally) two electrode patches.
tDCS refers to a continuous ﬂow of low-intensity electrical cur-
rent (typically around 1–2 mA) from one electrode patch (anodal)
to the other (cathodal). Cathodal stimulation of a brain region
hyperpolarizes membranes, ultimately resulting in decreased cor-
tical excitability, while anodal stimulation depolarizesmembranes,
ultimately resulting in increased cortical excitability (Nitsche and
Paulus, 2011; Paulus, 2011). Thus, depending on stimulation
parameters both rTMS and tDCS can increase or decrease the
excitability, and therefore efﬁcacy of contribution, of any cortical
region close enough the surface of the brain (Dayan et al., 2013).
That includes a great number of empiricalNCCs to target. Another
form of TES is tACS. In tACS the electrical current does not ﬂow
continuously from one electrode to the other, but instead ﬂows
rapidly back and forth between the two, reversing direction at an
externally ﬁxed frequency. As we will see below, this can be used
to modulate oscillatory brain activity. There are still other imple-
mentations of TES (e.g., transcranial random noise stimulation),
but these fall outside the scope of the current review. Collectively,
TMS and TES can be referred to as NIBS, which has already been,
and likely still will be, of great value to NCC research.
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THE NIBS CONTRIBUTION
What is the added value of NIBS, over and above the contrastive
method of neuroimaging with the paradigms described above?
With neuroimaging, it is difﬁcult to conclude whether or not
a region or process is functionally relevant. It remains an open
question whether or not, for example in fMRI, a regional BOLD
response reﬂects neural processing that is imperative for the task at
hand. For conscious vision, this means it is hard to know whether
the conscious percept would have been the same if this particu-
lar BOLD response had not obtained. In contrast, manipulating
brain activity directly with NIBS as an independent variable, and
then evaluating the effects on conscious vision, does allow one
to draw such conclusions on functional relevance. If a conscious
percept is abolished, because a brain region is disrupted, then
one way or another the disrupted region was functionally relevant
to conscious vision. We do think that advanced neuroimaging
paradigms and analyses (e.g., connectivity analysis; Friston et al.,
2003; Roebroeck et al., 2005; Friston, 2011) can actually make
substantial contributions to separating neural substrates, prereq-
uisites, and consequences (de Graaf et al., 2012b). But NIBS can
certainly complement this.
NIBS AND CONSCIOUS VISION
Since brain stimulation can make a unique contribution to the
disentangling of empirical NCCs, it may be useful to gain an
overview. In this section we therefore provide an exemplary,
though non-exhaustive, review of current literature on how NIBS
has contributed to our understanding of brain events underlying
conscious vision. It should become clear that most if not all of
this work goes beyond the concept of empirical NCCs, revealing
functional relevance of brain regions both before and after visual
stimulus onset and interactions between regions that inﬂuence the
quality or quantity of conscious vision.
PHOSPHENES
The simplest TMS protocol immediately reveals the value of TMS
for NCC research. A single TMS pulse, applied over occipital
cortex, can actually induce a conscious visual percept, called a
phosphene (e.g., Marg and Rudiak, 1994; Kammer, 1999). This in
itself is interesting, because phosphenes likely involve activity of
early visual cortex, such as regions V1/V2/V3 (Thielscher et al.,
2010). Unless substantial feedback from these areas to subcortical
regions turns out to be paramount to conscious vision, this sug-
gests that many subcortical processing steps elicited by exogenous
visual stimulation may not be necessary for conscious experience
per se. A simultaneous TMS-fMRI study could address the matter
of subcortical responses to a perceived phosphene, but this appears
to remain an empirical question.
With EEG, however, a recent study did manage to imple-
ment a strong ON–OFF paradigm to isolate phosphene-speciﬁc
responses across the (surface of the) brain. Taylor et al. (2010)
determined the TMS intensity that led to phosphene perception
in approximately half of all trials (the phosphene threshold). By
concurrently measuring EEG responses they could show that, in
phosphene-present trials versus phosphene-absent trials ceteris
paribus, widespread electrophysiological responses ranging from
occipital-posterior to frontal regions were speciﬁc to conscious
perception of phosphenes. These ON-speciﬁc responses became
apparent quite late, starting from 160 ms after the TMS pulse,
suggesting involvement of recurrent processing in conscious
vision.
The necessity of recurrent processing for conscious perception
of phosphenes had been shown earlier, in a landmark TMS paper
by Pascual-Leone and Walsh (2001). TMS applied over the human
motion area hMT/V5 is known to elicit moving phosphenes. But
when single TMS pulses below phosphene threshold were admin-
istered to early visual cortex (V1/V2), thus a cortical region earlier
in the visual hierarchy (Felleman andVanEssen, 1991), the percep-
tion of moving phosphenes from hMT/V5 pulses was diminished
or abolished. Importantly, this was only the case for TMS pulses
applied to early visual cortex after the TMS pulses to hMT/V5.
A TMS pulse to V1/V2 preceding the phosphene-eliciting pulse
to hMT/V5 had no effect. Thus, recurrent projections from this
extrastriate area toV1/V2 were necessary for the conscious percep-
tionof movingphosphenes. Feedback to early visual cortex activity
thus seems to be a neural prerequisite or substrate, not a conse-
quence. In an interesting follow-up study, Silvanto et al. (2005a)
reversed the paradigm, administering supra threshold TMS pulses
to early visual cortex, thus inducing stationary phosphenes, and
evaluating the effect of preceding sub threshold TMS pulses to
hMT/V5. They could show that such sub threshold TMS pulses,
too weak to elicit moving phosphenes in isolation, could nev-
ertheless affect the quality of phosphenes elicited by subsequent
supra threshold early visual cortex TMS. In short: the stationary
phosphenes started moving!
Another line of research on phosphenes has involved the study
of frontoparietal inﬂuences on early visual cortex. Starting with
frontal cortex, the bilateral cortical regions known as the frontal
eye ﬁelds (FEF) have been known to be involved in eye move-
ments and attention (Corbetta, 1998; Corbetta and Shulman,
2002). These regions were also related to successful perception of
visual stimuli, for instance in physiological studies with monkeys
(Thompson and Schall, 1999). Electrical stimulation of mon-
key FEF neurons 50–175 ms prior to a visual stimulus actually
improved detection of that stimulus (Moore and Fallah, 2001),
and follow-up work demonstrated an increase in sensitivity of
area V4 neurons by FEF stimulation (Moore and Armstrong,
2003). This and other work (e.g., Ekstrom et al., 2009) suggests
a top-down inﬂuence of FEF on early visual regions, with the pos-
sible consequence of improved conscious vision. Using TMS over
FEF in human subjects, Grosbras and Paus (2003) conﬁrmed this
hypothesis, showing that single TMS pulses over FEF preceding
visual stimuli could improve visual target detection in a masking
paradigm. Later work by Silvanto et al. (2006) demonstrated that
TMS over FEF also directly affected human motion area hMT/V5,
as TMSover FEF decreased the threshold for perception of moving
phosphenes. In a similar vein, TMS applied to parietal cortex (pos-
terior parietal cortex, PPC) decreased the threshold for stationary
phosphenes elicited by TMS over early visual cortex. But, interest-
ingly, only if PPC was stimulated in one hemisphere; bilateral PPC
stimulation canceled out this effect (Silvanto et al., 2009). Below,
we will return to TMS applied to frontal and parietal cortices in
the study of conscious vision, but ﬁrst we will address a rapidly
growing ﬁeld known as “TMS masking.”
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TMS OVER VISUAL CORTICES
Transcranial magnetic stimulation pulses applied to early visual
cortex at rest can elicit phosphenes. But if pulses are applied to
the same cortical structures (Kastner et al., 1998; Kammer, 1999),
they can also disrupt ongoing processing of a visual stimulus
(Amassian et al., 1989, 1993; Beckers and Hömberg, 1991; Ro et al.,
2003; de Graaf et al., 2011a,c, 2012a; Koivisto et al., 2011a; Jacobs
et al., 2012a,b; Salminen-Vaparanta et al., 2012) and thus abolish it
fromconsciousperception altogether. This demonstrates that early
visual cortex activations in the NCC are not consequences, but
actually crucial for a conscious percept to arise. It does not, unfor-
tunately, distinguish between substrates and prerequisites. But it
does strongly inform (e.g., recurrent) models of visual awareness,
due to the chronometric potential of TMS studies (for a recent
review see de Graaf et al., 2014).
By applying TMS pulses at a range of stimulus onset asyn-
chronies (SOAs), researchers could demonstrate that recurrent
interactions between early visual cortex and higher-order regions
are necessary for conscious perception not only of phosphenes,
but also when regular visual stimuli were used (e.g., Ro et al.,
2003). For example, Silvanto et al. (2005b) applied TMS pulses
at different SOAs to early visual cortex or to hMT/V5, measur-
ing conscious perception of motion stimuli. Chronometrically,
ﬁrst only early visual cortex TMS disrupted conscious per-
ception of motion, then only TMS over hMT/V5 disrupted
conscious perception, and subsequently only early visual cor-
tex TMS again disrupted conscious perception of motion (see
also Koivisto et al., 2010). Also for stationary stimuli, the
necessity of recurrent projections from extrastriate cortex (this
time lateral-occipital cortex) to early visual cortex was recently
demonstrated (Koivisto et al., 2011b). A very interesting recent
demonstration of how recurrent processing leads to conscious
vision involved the TMS-masking of Kanizsa-type illusory stim-
uli. TMS pulses applied to early visual cortex only successfully
masked such illusory percepts in SOAs following the SOAs in
which extrastriate cortex was functionally relevant (Wokke et al.,
2013).
Another interesting application of TMS in the masking
paradigm involves what has been referred to as “TMS-induced
blindsight” (Ro, 2010). TMS applied to early visual cortex can
abolish vision, but this can be measured and evaluated in two
ways: with direct subjective reports [“did you see the stimulus (fea-
ture)?”], or with (forced-choice) stimulus discrimination tasks. In
contrast to blindsight patients, participants with fully intact brains
have not had years of training and possible brain reorganization,
so it would be useful to probe “blindsight” behavior in them.
TMS has been used to this effect, and successfully demonstrated
blindsight-like behavioral patterns across a range of stimuli and
tasks. In trials without reported awareness of TMS-masked stim-
uli, “unseen” stimuli could still affect saccade responses (Ro et al.,
2004), reaching movements (Christensen et al., 2008; Ro, 2008),
emotion recognition (Jolij and Lamme, 2005), and even orienta-
tion and color discrimination (Boyer et al., 2005). The occurrence
of such dissociations seems to depend on SOA (Koivisto et al.,
2010; Jacobs et al., 2012b; Allen et al., 2014). Depending on stim-
uli and tasks, some have reported that TMS does affect subjective
and objective measures, as well as priming measures, as a whole
across SOAs (Sack et al., 2009; Jacobs et al., 2012a). And it has been
shown recently that the experimental paradigm and analysis can
make quite a difference as well. Lloyd et al. (2013) showed that,
in their experiments, obtained TMS-induced blindsight effects
disappeared when performing signal detection theory analysis,
suggesting that response criteria may play a large role and should
be controlled for. New evidence on this exciting topic is continu-
ally added, such as a very clever study by Allen et al. (2014) who
attempted to determine whether retinotectal and/or geniculate
subcortical pathways underlie TMS-induced blindsight effects, by
manipulating their stimuli such that the retinotectal (and magno-
cellular) pathways were bypassed. They found that blindsight-like
performance still obtained for such stimuli.
TMS OVER PARIETAL CORTEX
Interestingly, we canmake a smooth transition fromTMSmasking
to TMS studies of the role of parietal cortex in conscious vision,
because recent reports suggest that phosphenes can be elicited by
TMSover parietal cortex as well (Marzi et al., 2009). Andwhile one
recent study did not obtain consistent visual suppression by TMS
pulses over these parietal regions (Tapia et al., 2014), Koivisto et al.
(2014) did report evidence for parietal (inferior parietal sulcus)
TMS masking of speciﬁcally subjective conscious vision.
Quite a number of TMS studies have addressed the func-
tional role of parietal cortex in conscious vision, even if the
distinction between attention and consciousness was not always
clear. In bistable vision paradigms, ofﬂine TMS-induced “vir-
tual lesions” of parietal cortex affected the rate of perceptual
switching (Carmel et al., 2010; Kanai et al., 2010, 2011), where
the direction of effect (increased or decreased switch rates) was
found to depend on the exact parietal region stimulated (Kanai
et al., 2011). Effects of online parietal TMS on binocular rivalry
have also been shown (Miller et al., 2000; Zaretskaya et al., 2010).
Mechanisms in parietal cortex may thus play a role in the main-
tenance of conscious percepts, as also suggested by the ﬁnding
that parietal TMS pulses can actually induce fading of a continu-
ous peripheral stimulus from consciousness (Kanai et al., 2008).
A more general role of resource allocation among competing
percepts is suggested by the ﬁnding that decreasing excitability
of right parietal cortex by continuous TBS (an inhibitory rTMS
protocol) rather increased the durations of target disappearance
in a motion-induced blindness paradigm (Nuruki et al., 2013).
Parietal cortex has further been shown functionally relevant for
visual awareness in TMS studies on change blindness (Beck et al.,
2006; Tseng et al., 2010), attentional blink (Kihara et al., 2007),
and conscious perception of an illusory gestalt (Zaretskaya et al.,
2013).
One line of TMS research on the role of parietal cortex in visual
awareness we ﬁnd particularly intriguing, and it concerns TMS-
induced extinction (Pascual-Leone et al., 1994). Patients with
“neglect,” and the symptom of “extinction,” were described above.
Using TMS over parietal cortex, extinction-like behavior could
be replicated in healthy participants (Pascual-Leone et al., 1994),
which may be attributable to a biasing of interhemispheric com-
petition for attentional resource allocation. Parietal TMS effects
“suppressing” contralateral space and occasionally “enhancing”
ipsilateral space have been found repeatedly (Seyal et al., 1995;
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Hilgetag et al., 2001; Meister et al., 2006; Muggleton et al., 2006;
Oliveri and Caltagirone, 2006; Eshel et al., 2010; Bien et al., 2012;
Szczepanski and Kastner, 2013; for a recent review on attentional
enhancements by NIBS see Duecker et al., 2014). Interestingly,
and in keeping with the idea of interhemispheric competition,
TMS delivered over both parietal cortices simultaneously actually
abolishes this effect (Dambeck et al., 2006).
TMS OVER FRONTAL CORTEX
Parietal and frontal cortex are frequently mentioned together, as
a “frontoparietal network,” because they simply do often co-occur
in neuroimaging studies in general, and NCC studies particularly.
For some NCC paradigms, frontal regions have subsequently been
shown to be functionally relevant. For example, we already saw
how TMS pulses over FEF can improve visual target detection
(Grosbras and Paus, 2003). In subsequent work, TMS applied over
FEF concurrently with fMRI was shown to have BOLD effects
in low-level visual cortices, compatible with observed effects on
psychophysics (Ruff et al., 2006). We already saw that FEF pulses
facilitated perception of moving phosphenes from hMT/V5 TMS
(Silvanto et al., 2006), and Amassian et al. (2008) reported frontal
TMS-induced facilitation of complex phosphenes elicited by early
visual cortex pulses, as well as facilitated reporting of weakly
illuminated letter stimuli.
For bistable vision paradigms, there is surprisingly little pub-
lished research with frontal brain stimulation. Neuroimaging has
often implicated both frontal and parietal activity in perceptual
switching in bistable paradigms (see references above). For exam-
ple, it was shown with fMRI that speciﬁcally frontal activity occurs
earlier for spontaneous percept reversals than externally induced
(“replay”) reversals (Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 2007), suggesting a
causal role (Sterzer et al., 2009). On the other hand, there is recent
evidence that if the gradual transition of percept reversals (Knapen
et al., 2011) or percept reporting (Frässle et al., 2014) are controlled
for, frontal activations conventionally obtained in bistable vision
studies with fMRI may be reduced or no longer found. When
it comes to NIBS, while parietal disruption leads to effects (see
above), we are not aware of studies demonstrating functional rel-
evance of frontal regions for spontaneous perceptual reversals in
passive bistable vision so far. (Virtual) lesions of frontal cortex
appeared to affect voluntarily induced reversal rates, though no
such effect on passive viewing reversals was found (Windmann
et al., 2006; de Graaf et al., 2011b). Yet the frontal lobe is large
and null results remain fundamentally limited (de Graaf and Sack,
2011). It could be worthwhile to combine fMRI with neuronavi-
gated brain stimulation in future studies to further elucidate the
role of frontal regions in passive bistable vision. For the moment
we dare not say whether, speciﬁcally in the context of bistable
paradigms, frontal NCCs are neural consequences, prerequisites
or substrates.
There does seem to be evidence for frontal involvement in
visual awareness as a metacognitive process. TMS over dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) decreased detection of visual
change (Turatto et al., 2004). FMRI research controlling for objec-
tive visual task performance found a speciﬁcally frontal activation
corresponding to subjective visual report (Lau and Passingham,
2006), and in a group of frontal lesion patients, predominantly
subjective visual awareness in a masking paradigm was decreased
(Del Cul et al., 2009). In line with this, a theta-burst TMS
study in healthy volunteers inhibited bilateral DLPFC and inves-
tigated metacognitive sensitivity to visual stimuli. Concretely, a
response-bias free measure was calculated, quantifying how well
participants’ subjective reports of visibility could discriminate
their correct or incorrect responses to the same visual stimuli.
Frontal TMS decreased this metacognitive sensitivity, and further
analysis suggested that this was speciﬁcally due to decreased visi-
bility on trials with correctly identiﬁed visual stimuli (Rounis et al.,
2010).
ADVANCED NIBS PROTOCOLS AND THE STUDY OF
CONSCIOUS VISION
We have seen examples of inspiring TMS experiments that directly
tested, and demonstrated, functional relevance of brain regions
for conscious vision, as well as functional relevance of particular
projections between brain regions for conscious vision. Evidence
for the latter, while revealing, was generally indirect; for exam-
ple with the inference of feedforward and feedback projections
between early visual cortex and motion area hMT/V5 from the
relative temporal patterns of TMS-induced perceptual disruptions
(Silvanto et al., 2005b). But new paradigms of NIBS may more
directly address the functional relevance of brain interactions, as
we discuss below. Similarly, new protocols may widen the range
of NCCs that can be tested for causal involvement in conscious
perception.
ENTRAINMENT AND PHASE COHERENCE
Starting with the latter, TMS or tDCS entrainment protocols may
be used to test the causal involvement of oscillatory NCCs. The
power (Thut et al., 2006; van Dijk et al., 2008) and phase (Mathew-
son et al., 2009) of alpha oscillations in parietal–occipital cortex,
for example, has been related to attention/perception, indexing
the successful detection of visual targets (see also Busch et al.,
2009; Mathewson et al., 2010, 2012; de Graaf et al., 2013) and
see Jensen and Mazaheri (2010), Britz and Michel (2011), and
Mathewson et al. (2011) for recent reviews. The relevance of
these alpha oscillations had already been probed with TMS by
demonstrating that their power (Romei et al., 2008) and phase
(Dugué et al., 2011) at TMS pulse onset directly reﬂected visual
cortex excitability as measured by phosphene perception. The
hypothesis arose that rhythmic TMS might actually phase-lock
and/or amplify such oscillations if the rhythm was of compat-
ible frequency (Thut et al., 2011a). Thut et al. (2011b) could
indeed demonstrate that alpha-frequency TMS ampliﬁes alpha
oscillations in the brain, and Romei et al. (2010) showed that
such a TMS entrainment protocol had attentional/perceptual
consequences. Speciﬁcally for alpha-frequency, and in a retino-
topically speciﬁc location, visual performance was enhanced,
directly demonstrating the causal relevance of these oscillatory
patterns for conscious vision. Rhythmic TMS was recently used
to conﬁrm also the functional relevance of alpha phase for visual
perception (Jaegle and Ro, 2014). Helfrich et al. (2014) recently
demonstrated, using simultaneous EEG and tACS, that alpha
oscillations can successfully be induced by tACS at the same
frequency, moreover with perceptual consequences. The idea
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of TMS (or tACS) entrainment to test functional relevance of
endogenous oscillations has moreover been extended to other fre-
quencies and paradigms (Romei et al., 2011, 2012; Neuling et al.,
2012).
Another recent development in the ﬁeld of NIBS is the use
of tACS over different regions to bring interregional oscillations
either in coherence, or out of phase. This method was pio-
neered by Polanía et al. (2012), who applied tACS over frontal
and parietal cortex at theta-frequency (and control frequencies).
Importantly, either the frontal and parietal oscillatory stimulation
were at the same phase (0◦ phase-lag), or in anti-phase (180◦ phase
lag). Matching prior correlational evidence from EEG, speciﬁ-
cally the in-phase frontoparietal stimulation, at the appropriate
frequency, led to enhanced task performance. Anti-phase stimula-
tion actually resulted in a performance decrement. Thus,NIBS can
now also be used to study the functional relevance of previously
observed oscillations, and the relevance of interregional coherence
of oscillations, implicated in conscious vision.
A very recent example successfully demonstrates this approach.
Strüber et al. (2013) took advantage of the fact that a par-
ticular bistable visual stimulus, the “motion quartet,” involves
inter hemispheric communication in one perceptual interpreta-
tion (horizontal motion across the vertical meridian) but not
in the other perceptual interpretation (vertical motion across
the horizontal meridian). Perceptual switches in this paradigm
had previously been linked to changes in the synchronization of
gamma-band oscillations, so the authors applied 40 Hz (and 6 Hz
as a control) tACS to bilateral occipital cortices, at either 0 degrees
phase-lag or 180◦ phase-lag. Speciﬁcally for anti-phasic tACS at
speciﬁcally 40 Hz, they observed both perceptual effects in the
form of less perceived horizontal motion and effects on coherence
in the gamma-band as measured by EEG.
CONCLUSION
A review of the literature suggests that researchers in the ﬁeld
of NCC are often aware of the conceptual limitations around
neuroimaging-based, empirical NCCs, either implicitly or explic-
itly advising caution with regards to interpretations of functional
roles. We believe that the explicit division of empirical NCCs
into three possible functional roles, which are neural prerequi-
sites, neural substrates, and neural consequences, remains a useful
one. Review of the literature also demonstrates how valuable
NIBS can be, and indeed has already been, for the enlighten-
ment of these functional roles as a complement to neuroimaging
research. The growing number of brain stimulation experiments,
and the continuous development of new stimulation techniques
and protocols, is a testament to the potential and value of
brain stimulation. Hopefully, many more applications of NIBS
in the context of NCC research can be expected. And hope-
fully, the framework of three NCCs will prove useful in this
endeavor.
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